Understood. I will conduct a deep analysis of the practical outcomes of a full Greens majority government in Australia over the short (5–10 years) and medium (up to 20 years) term, assuming they are able to implement their policies unopposed. This thought experiment will focus primarily on economic feasibility, weighing concerns about taxation, corporate opposition, labor market effects, and fiscal sustainability.This analysis will include:

• Housing Policy: Feasibility of large-scale public housing, rent freezes, and investor tax reforms.
• Healthcare: The economic impact of expanding Medicare to include dental and mental health.
• Public Services & Welfare: Effects of free university/TAFE, income support increases, and social service expansions.
• Taxation & Fiscal Policy: Sustainability of Greens tax proposals (wealth tax, corporate super-profits tax) in funding policies.
• Macroeconomic Effects: Labor market shifts, potential inflationary effects, corporate responses, and international case studies (e.g., Nordic welfare models). I will balance feasibility concerns (e.g., housing construction capacity, doctor shortages, corporate tax avoidance risks) with evidence from historical precedents and international examples to assess what would realistically happen in a Greens-governed Australia. I will report back with a structured summary of the key findings.

Introduction

A hypothetical full Greens majority government in Australia would usher in an ambitious expansion of public housing, healthcare, education, and welfare – funded by significant new taxes on wealth and corporate profits. This analysis examines the economic feasibility of these policies being implemented unopposed, weighing their cost sustainability, impacts on markets and the labor force, and likely corporate responses. Historical precedents (from Australia’s post-war housing programs to Nordic welfare models) and international comparisons (like Vienna’s housing or the UK’s NHS) will inform which policies seem achievable and which face economic roadblocks. We consider both short-term (5–10 year) impacts – such as implementation challenges, inflation risks, and market reactions – and medium-term (10–20 year) outcomes – including fiscal sustainability, long-run growth, and structural shifts in the economy and society. The goal is a balanced assessment of how Australia’s economy and fiscal landscape might evolve under an unabashedly Greens policy agenda.

1. Housing Policy

Greens’ Housing Plan: The Greens propose a massive public home-building program, aiming for 1 million new public homes over 20 years (with 360,000 in the first 5 years). This would be achieved via a national public developer competing with private buildersgreenstreetnews.com. According to Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) costings, 360k homes in 5 years (610k in a decade) would require large upfront outlays but yield substantial rental and sale income. The PBO found a net **budget cost of ~27.9 billion over 10 years** for 610k homes[greenleft.org.au](https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/greens-mp-max-chandler-mather-three-policies-tackle-housing-crisis#:~:text=The%20Parliamentary%20Budget%20Office%20,9%20billion), once rental revenues and house sales (at cost) are reinvested. The gross spend is much higher (over n280b in that decadegreenstreetnews.com), but because units are sold at a modest markup or rented at capped affordable rates, most costs recycle back into the programwww.greenleft.org.au. This suggests the plan could be fiscally feasible if financed by cheap public borrowing – essentially a revolving fund that becomes self-sustaining as rental income and sale proceeds fund new constructionwww.greenleft.org.au.Feasibility of Building at Scale: Constructing ~360k homes in 5 years is extremely ambitious – roughly 30% more than Australia’s current annual housing construction ratewww.greenleft.org.au. It would require ramping up the construction workforce and materials supply. Historically, however, Australia has achieved comparable building booms: in the post-WWII decade, roughly 590,000 public or government-financed houses were built (202k under 1945–50 Labor, then 388k under 1950s Menzies government)www.fresheconomicthinking.com. That effort rapidly boosted homeownership and met a wartime housing shortfall. If it was possible in the 1940s–50s – when Australia had fewer workers and less mechanization – the Greens argue it is achievable today with better technology and planninggreenstreetnews.com. Internationally, Vienna’s social housing is an instructive model: starting in the 1920s, Vienna built a huge stock of municipal housing such that ~60% of residents now live in rent-controlled or public homeswww.greenleft.org.au. This large supply keeps rents in Vienna relatively moderate and stable. The Greens’ plan, similarly, envisions building enough housing to not only clear social housing waitlists but also offer middle-income earners an affordable rental or purchase optionwww.greenleft.org.au. In practice, scaling up to this level would strain capacity in the short run – new apprentices and trades would need training, and materials supply (timber, steel) must expand. These are manageable constraints if addressed with workforce programs and perhaps relaxed immigration for skilled trades. The short-term economic impact would be a construction jobs boom and stimulus to industries supplying housing materials. There is some risk of bottlenecks and cost inflation in construction (as a sudden increase in public building could drive up wages and prices for materials). Careful phasing (e.g. ramping up to that 360k target over a couple of years) could alleviate extreme supply pressures.Rent Freeze and Price Caps: Alongside supply measures, the Greens call for emergency rental controls – an immediate 2-year rent freeze nationwide, followed by ongoing caps of at most 2% rent increase every 2 yearsgreens.org.au. This policy, aimed at stopping soaring rents, is inspired by European practices. Several European countries (Netherlands, Austria, France, parts of Germany) have long-standing rent regulation, and data show Europe’s rent increases have been far lower than Australia’s in recent yearswww.greenleft.org.au. A temporary freeze would indeed give renters “breathing space”www.greenleft.org.au and dampen inflation (rent is a major component of CPI). The economic concern, however, is that strict rent control without boosting supply can deter investment in rental housing. Landlords may decide to sell or convert rentals to other uses if they cannot get returns, potentially worsening housing availability over time. The Greens attempt to solve this by coupling the rent cap with the mass public housing build-out. In theory, the state becomes the provider of new affordable rentals, offsetting any pullback by private investors. Vienna’s example again is instructive: rent caps worked there largely because public supply was abundantwww.greenleft.org.au. In the short term, a 2-year freeze is unlikely to cause an exodus of landlords (given the limited period), and it would immediately relieve renters’ financial stress. Over 5–10 years, as rents are capped, private developers might shift toward building for owner-occupiers or higher-end projects not subject to caps, leaving more of the rental market to public and non-profit providers. It’s a significant market intervention, and while it can succeed if public housing fills the gap, it’s a delicate balance – too stringent a cap without enough new supply could create rental shortages (as seen in some cities with strict rent control). The Greens’ plan for a National Renters’ Authority would enforce the rules, and national coordination (through National Cabinet) would be needed since tenancy laws are usually state-basedgreens.org.au. Overall, rent freezes/caps are economically feasible as a short-term measure to curb inflation and exploitation, but maintaining them long-term requires the parallel success of the housing construction program to avoid suppressing rental supply.Investor Tax Reforms (Negative Gearing and CGT): A major structural change in housing policy would be ending tax concessions for property investors. The Greens advocate phasing out negative gearing (which allows rental property losses to be deducted against other income) and reducing the capital gains tax discount on property salesgreens.org.au. These tax breaks are seen as “handouts” driving speculative investment and high home prices. Economically, removing these perks should, in theory, dampen investor demand for existing houses, helping cool price growth and improve affordability for owner-occupiers. Australia’s own history provides a precedent: for a brief period in the 1980s (1985–1987) negative gearing was abolished – investment dropped initially, but there was also anecdotal evidence of upward pressure on rents in tight markets, leading to its reinstatement. More recently, New Zealand restricted mortgage interest deductibility for landlords (a similar reform) and has seen a decline in investor buying and some moderation in prices. We would expect short-term market impacts such as: house prices softening (as fewer tax-subsidized investors bid them up) and possibly some current landlords selling marginally profitable properties. That price correction would be a feature, not a bug from an affordability perspective – but politically it could draw fire for eroding homeowner equity. Rents in the short run might not fall, since rental supply would shrink if some investors exit. However, if the government’s public housing and affordable rentals are coming online, that new supply could compensate and prevent rent hikes. Over the medium term (10+ years), redirecting investment from speculative housing to more productive sectors could benefit the economy: instead of pouring savings into existing homes for a tax break, capital might flow to businesses or new construction. Still, we must note distributional effects – middle-class households who planned on property investment for retirement would need alternative strategies, and the construction industry might need to pivot from building investor-focused units (like small apartments) to more owner-occupier and public projects. These tax reforms are fiscally beneficial (Treasury estimates have shown negative gearing and CGT discounts cost the budget tens of billions per yearwww.greenleft.org.au). Ending them could save ~$27b a year – notably, about the same as the net cost of the Greens’ housing programwww.greenleft.org.auwww.greenleft.org.au. In effect, money currently spent subsidizing landlords would be redirected to building homes – a substantial efficiency gain if implemented. The main obstacles are political and corporate: the property and construction lobby would strongly oppose these changes (as they did when similar policies were floated in the 2019 election). If the Greens majority can override that opposition, the economic fundamentals of the reform (more supply, less speculative demand) align with improved housing affordability in the long run.Historical and International Context: Australia’s past large-scale housing interventions show both possibilities and pitfalls. The post-war housing drive (under both Labor and Liberal governments) succeeded in rapidly increasing homeownership – but notably, many of those publicly built homes were eventually sold to tenants at discountswww.fresheconomicthinking.comwww.fresheconomicthinking.com. That boosted homeownership but diminished the public rental stock over time. The Greens plan is somewhat different: while it allows sales, buyers can only resell back to the government, preserving affordability in perpetuitywww.greenleft.org.au. Internationally, social housing models like those in Vienna and Singapore demonstrate that large-scale public involvement can stabilize housing costs. Vienna kept a mixed-income approach – even middle-income residents can live in city-owned housing – which the Greens emulate by making their housing open to all income levels (with rents capped at 25% of income)www.greenleft.org.auwww.greenleft.org.au. This broad base means the public housing developer would earn revenue from moderate-income tenants as well, improving financial viabilitywww.greenleft.org.au. An economic side effect is competition with private developers: a government developer selling at-cost homes exerts downward pressure on market prices. Private builders may have to innovate or accept lower margins to compete, which could benefit consumers (as Max Chandler-Mather quipped, private developers seeing cheap high-quality public homes “are going to have to compete with that”www.greenleft.org.au). In the short run, developers and real estate investors would likely lobby fiercely or even slow-roll projects in protest, but over the medium term, the housing sector would adjust to a new equilibrium where the government is a major player. If successful, 10–20 years under these policies could reshape Australia’s housing mix – with far more people in stable public or non-profit housing, less speculative price growth, and housing seen more as infrastructure (a public good) than purely as an investment asset. The major economic challenge will be maintaining construction momentum and financing through economic cycles: a recession could tempt cuts to public building, and cost overruns or delays could erode the intended supply. However, with political will and steady funding, there is no technical reason Australia couldn’t achieve a building program of this scale, given our past achievements and examples abroad.Summary (Housing): In sum, the Greens’ housing platform – massive public construction, rent controls, and investor tax reform – is economically bold but plausible. Funding isn’t the biggest barrier (the net costs are relatively moderate when revenues are recycledwww.greenleft.org.auwww.greenleft.org.au, and savings from ending tax perks can be redirected). The real tests are practical capacity and market dynamics. Short-term, Australians could see a construction boom, immediate rent relief, and likely a cooling of house prices. Medium-term, if executed well, the payoff could be structurally lower housing costs, reduced homelessness, and a more stable housing market (akin to a European social market model). Potential roadblocks include resistance from the real estate industry, the risk of construction bottlenecks or inflation, and ensuring ongoing political commitment over decades to see the program through. Nonetheless, historical precedent (post-WWII) and international models (Vienna) suggest that building hundreds of thousands of affordable homes is achievable with sustained public investment.www.fresheconomicthinking.comwww.greenleft.org.au

2. Healthcare Expansion

Universal Dental and Mental Healthcare: A cornerstone of the Greens’ platform is to expand Medicare to cover dental care for all Australians, and strengthen mental health coverage. Dental care is currently largely private in Australia (with some public services for low-income groups), so including it under Medicare is a transformative change. The cost is correspondingly large: the Parliamentary Budget Office estimated that a universal dental scheme (starting 2025) would cost about $14 billion in its first year and$n196 billion over ten yearswww.theguardian.com. This figure (which is roughly an extra 1% of GDP per year in health spending) reflects the pent-up demand – many Australians skip dentist visits due to cost, so usage would surge once free. Similarly, providing unlimited Medicare-funded psychologist/mental health visits or establishing free mental health clinics would add billions more. The Greens have proposed 1,000 new free public health clinics (at least 6 per electorate) to offer GP, dental, mental health, and nursing services at no costgreens.org.augreens.org.au. Their overall primary care package (free GPs + dental + mental health) is costed at 54 billion over a decade**[greens.org.au](https://greens.org.au/news/media-release/greens-announce-election-plan-free-gp-dentist-psychologist-nurse-visits#:~:text=Each%20of%20these%20policies%20has,54b%20over%20the%20coming%20decade) – which appears to be a partial figure (likely not full universal dental, but significant expansion). Regardless, we are looking at on the order of **n15–20 billion per year additional healthcare spending once fully rolled out. Funding feasibility: The Greens plan to fund this via new taxes on corporations and the wealthy (discussed in Section 4). For instance, they cite a “Big Corporations Super-Profits Tax” that could raise **514 billion over 10 years**[greens.org.au](https://greens.org.au/news/media-release/greens-announce-election-plan-free-gp-dentist-psychologist-nurse-visits#:~:text=This%20election%2C%20the%20Greens%20are,as%20other%20measures%20to%20come) – which would amply cover the ~n200–250b needed for dental, mental, and other expansions. In principle, if that revenue materialized, the funding is sustainable without unsupportable deficits. However, as we will examine later, such revenue projections carry uncertainty (tax avoidance, behavioral changes). Short-term, the government might need to borrow to bridge any lag between implementing services and fully capturing new tax revenue, adding to public debt.Workforce and Capacity Constraints: Money isn’t the only feasibility concern – healthcare workforce capacity is critical. Suddenly making dental free would unleash demand that could outstrip the supply of dentists and oral health professionals. The PBO explicitly noted uncertainty about “sufficient qualified dental professionals to meet increased demand” and assumed a gradual phase-in over 5 years up to 85% utilization ratewww.pbo.gov.auwww.pbo.gov.au. This suggests that even with funding, it may take years to train or recruit enough dentists/hygienists to serve everyone. In the short run, wait times for dental care could actually rise if demand spikes faster than supply, potentially causing frustration unless managed. The Greens’ plan of free clinics in every community also means hiring thousands of doctors, dentists, nurses, and psychologists on the public payroll. Workforce training investment would need to accompany the policy (e.g. expanding university places for dentistry, offering incentives for specialists to work in public clinics). There could be a transitional inflationary effect on healthcare wages – as the government competes with private practices to hire providers, wages might be bid up. However, given many dentists today are under-utilized because patients can’t afford care, activating latent capacity could be efficient. Countries with universal health systems often regulate provider fees and salaries to contain costs, something Australia would likely do via Medicare fee schedules (the PBO assumed payments at current Child Dental Benefit Schedule rateswww.pbo.gov.au).Health Outcomes and Productivity: Expanding healthcare access has clear social benefits – untreated dental and mental health issues are widespread, affecting quality of life and productivity. Poor dental health can lead to other medical complications (heart disease links, etc.), and untreated mental illness can reduce workforce participation and increase disability claims. By medium term (10+ years), one would expect improved health outcomes: e.g. lower rates of chronic dental diseases, and potentially a more mentally resilient workforce. These can have positive economic spillovers. For example, better dental care means fewer sick days or emergencies; better mental healthcare can improve job performance and reduce homelessness or incarceration related to mental illness. Quantifying productivity gains is tricky, but studies of universal healthcare expansions (like the introduction of national health services in the UK or Canada’s single-payer system) generally show a healthier population contributes to higher workforce productivity and can even lower some costs (employers may spend less on private insurance or sick leave). Over decades, a healthier workforce could partially offset the fiscal cost through higher tax revenues (from higher earnings) and lower social costs (like less need for disability payments). However, the return on investment is long-term – the government must front the costs now, while many benefits accrue gradually.Comparative Models: Many developed nations provide broader public healthcare than Australia. The UK’s NHS, for example, covers almost all medical costs and some dental care, though NHS dentistry is limited and often has co-pays. The NHS consumes around 10% of UK GDP in public spending. If Australia adds dental and mental health, health spending might rise from ~9% to ~11% of GDP, comparable to the UK or France (which have extensive coverage). Nordic countries offer universal healthcare and often include dental for children (and heavily subsidize adult dental care). For instance, in Denmark and Sweden, dental care for adults is partly subsidized (not completely free, but affordable), and these countries still manage health outcomes among the world’s best. One lesson from abroad is that universal health systems require robust taxation and cost controls. The Greens’ approach is heavy on new taxes for revenue, but cost control will also matter – e.g., setting appropriate Medicare rebate rates for dental, negotiating prices for devices and medications (if dental includes things like crowns or dentures, controlling those costs is important). Another factor is private sector response: Australia has a private health insurance industry that currently sells “extras” coverage for dental/optical. A free dental program would effectively obsolete a chunk of that business. In the short run, private insurers might see losses or exit the dental market; some dentists might initially resist if they fear lower fees under Medicare schedules. Yet, in the UK and Canada, private insurance still coexists (for things not covered or for faster service). We might see a shrinking of the private health sector overall, with resources shifting to the public system. That can free up administrative overhead (since single-payer is more efficient than duplicative private billing), but also means job losses in insurance administration. Economically, that’s a redistribution of employment from insurance clerks to frontline healthcare roles, which could be a net positive for service delivery.Funding via Taxation – Sustainability: Funding expanded healthcare “through taxation” is feasible if the tax base is stable. The Greens plan explicitly ties the dental and GP expansions to revenue from taxing “big corporations’ excessive profits”greens.org.au and billionaires. For example, **514 billion/decade from a super-profits tax** was earmarked to fund dental and free GP visits[greens.org.au](https://greens.org.au/news/media-release/greens-announce-election-plan-free-gp-dentist-psychologist-nurse-visits#:~:text=This%20election%2C%20the%20Greens%20are,as%20other%20measures%20to%20come). If those taxes come through as projected, the healthcare spending is sustainable without increasing debt. However, if corporate profits dip in a recession or if companies find ways to avoid the new tax, revenue could fall short. A prudent approach might be to implement healthcare expansion in stages – e.g., start with free dental for children and low-income adults (as some proposals suggest) then expand to all adults once the system capacity and revenue streams are proven. The PBO scenario actually phased dental coverage by groups from 2025 to 2029[pbo.gov.au](https://www.pbo.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-03/PER639%20%20GRN%20%20Protect%20Medicare%20and%20expand%20it%20to%20cover%20dental%20care%20expanding%20to%20universal%20dental%20coverage%20by%202025.PDF#:~:text=This%20component%20would%20expand%20the,Medicare%2C%20from%201%20July%202025), which could spread out costs. Additionally, it’s worth noting that **preventative care can save costs down the line**. A study by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare found that many Australians delay dental care for cost, leading to more expensive acute treatments later. So, while universal dental might cost nearly n200b/decadewww.theguardian.com, some fraction of that might be offset by savings in other health expenditures (fewer ER visits for dental abscesses, etc.) and improved general health reducing other strain on the system. Internationally, Canada is considering adding dental to its Medicare; early estimates put it at ~$12b/year (similar to the PBO’s ~$n11-14b/year for Australia)www.9news.com.au. These are large sums, but countries have shown it’s possible to absorb them: for instance, the UK spends about £10b/year on dentistry through the NHS (with some patient charges), indicating a comparable scale.Bottom Line (Healthcare): Implementing universal dental and mental healthcare in Australia would be expensive but achievable if paired with robust new revenues. In the short term, challenges would include ramping up the healthcare workforce and managing a surge in demand (to prevent long wait times). There could be inflationary pressure in the health sector and disruption to private insurance markets as the public sector takes on a larger role. However, the social benefits – improved health equity and outcomes – are significant, and models like the NHS and Nordic systems show that wealthy societies can successfully provide such services. The economic feasibility hinges on the government’s ability to raise and maintain higher tax revenue: an extra ~1–1.5% of GDP in health spending requires a similar increase in tax intake. Assuming the Greens can enforce their tax plan, expanded healthcare is sustainable in the medium term, and may even bolster the economy through a healthier, more productive populace. The major roadblocks would be corporate opposition to the taxes needed, and ensuring the supply side (doctors, dentists, clinics) grows fast enough to meet the Greens’ universal coverage promise.www.theguardian.comgreens.org.au

3. Public Services & Welfare

Free Education (University/TAFE): The Greens envision making university and TAFE free for students, restoring the principle that education is a public good. Australia actually had free tertiary education from 1974 until the late 1980s, so there is historical precedent. Reintroducing it now would mean the government forgoing the roughly $7–10 billion per year** in revenue from student fees/HECS loans (and likely covering a larger higher-ed budget due to expanded enrollment). The economic impact of a **debt-free educated workforce** could be positive in multiple ways. First, graduates without tens of thousands in student debt are more able to **participate in the economy** – they can save for a home sooner, start businesses, or make career choices not constrained by loan repayment burdens. Research has shown that student debt can depress rates of homeownership and small business formation; for example, a U.S. Federal Reserve study found a one standard deviation increase in student debt correlates with a **14$n70 billion). While that’s a large sum, it’s an intra-governmental debt (owed to the government itself); writing it off doesn’t require external financing, but it does mean foregoing future repayments that would have trickled in over decades. The benefit is freeing up millions of Australians from loan repayment, effectively increasing their disposable income by a few hundred dollars a month each (the Greens cite an average of 5,500 per year per graduate would be saved[greens.org.au](https://greens.org.au/tax-big-corps-billionaires#:~:text=4.%2050,so%20they%20work%20for%20people)). This is money that can flow into consumption or investment, providing a **stimulus effect**. Critics might argue it’s a windfall to those who already graduated (many of whom are now higher earners), but from a macro perspective it could still boost sectors like housing and consumer spending. Over the **medium term**, the free education policy could produce a more **equitable and skilled labor force** – students might choose fields based on aptitude and societal need rather than future salary (since they won’t bear debt regardless of choice), potentially alleviating shortages in areas like teaching or nursing that students might avoid due to poor pay-to-debt payoff. The key economic consideration is **whether the government can fund universities adequately** in lieu of fees, to maintain quality and capacity for more students. That likely means higher direct operating grants to universities, which could be covered by the new tax revenues or reprioritizing budget (e.g., spending less on subsidies that become unnecessary – for instance, if more domestic students fill university places, reliance on international student fees might lessen).**Welfare Increases (JobSeeker n88/day and Others): The Greens have championed raising income support payments above the poverty line – specifically lifting JobSeeker (unemployment benefit) to $88 per day** (about$n1,232 per fortnight, or 32k annually) and aligning other payments (Disability Support, Aged Pension, etc.) to similar levels[pbo.gov.au](https://www.pbo.gov.au/elections/2022-general-election/2022-election-commitment-costings/no-one-poverty-ecr558#:~:text=The%20proposal%20would%20increase%20the,day%20for%20payments%20specified%20below). This would be a dramatic increase from the current JobSeeker rate (around n50 per day in 2023 after recent small boosts). PBO costings for the Greens’ “No One in Poverty” plan (which included $88/day and various supplement changes) indicate a **very large fiscal impact**: about **$n134.5 billion over the forward estimates (4 years)www.pbo.gov.au. This suggests roughly $30–35b extra per year in welfare spending initially – a huge expansion of the social safety net. The rationale is that it would eliminate extreme poverty and provide a livable income floor. The **short-term effects** on the economy would be significant: low-income recipients have a high **marginal propensity to consume**, so nearly every extra dollar would be spent on goods and services, acting as a **stimulus** to demand. In depressed economic conditions, this stimulus could create jobs and increase GDP. However, in a full-employment scenario, that surge in consumption could contribute to **inflationary pressure**, unless matched by increased supply of goods or higher taxes on others to neutralize the demand. The Greens likely anticipate funding this via their wealth and corporate taxes as well, redistributing from top to bottom. If$n30b more is given to welfare recipients and $30b is taxed from the wealthy/corporations, the net demand effect might actually be stimulatory (since high-wealth individuals spend a smaller share of their income than the poor, so redistribution generally raises consumption overall). That can be economically positive for growth, but again raises the specter of inflation if not carefully managed.A big concern economists raise with substantially higher welfare benefits is **labor market disincentives**. Will a$n88/day JobSeeker reduce recipients’ incentive to seek employment? At $616 per week, JobSeeker under the Greens plan would be not far below the full-time minimum wage (~$n812/week gross as of 2024). The PBO analysis cautioned that effective marginal tax rates for some low-wage workers would approach 100% – for example, someone could work full-time at minimum wage and still technically qualify for some JobSeeker, meaning each extra dollar they earn might reduce their benefit a dollarwww.pbo.gov.au. This creates a potential trap where working more doesn’t net more income, undermining work incentiveswww.philadelphiafed.org. The Greens did include measures to mitigate this, like increasing income-free areas and reducing taper rates for benefitswww.pbo.gov.au, but the sheer size of the payment could still make entry-level jobs unattractive to some. International experience is mixed: Nordic countries have generous unemployment benefits (often 70–90% of prior wage for a time) but crucially they combine them with active labor market policies – training, job search support, and requirements to take available jobs. The Deloitte review of the Nordic model notes that despite generous benefits, Nordics sustain higher employment rates than the OECD average by coupling welfare with strong work incentives and expectationswww2.deloitte.comwww2.deloitte.com. For Greens’ policy to avoid long-term dependency, Australia would likely need to implement similar active measures and perhaps time limits or step-downs for the unemployment payment. Since the question assumes Greens implement their agenda unopposed, we might assume they also overhaul employment services in a less punitive but still engagement-focused way. In the short term (5 years), raising JobSeeker would pull many out of poverty and could slightly reduce labor supply at the margins – e.g., some people might take longer to find a “suitable” job rather than any job, because they aren’t in dire desperation. But that can be positive if it leads to better job matching and less exploitation. It could, however, pose challenges for industries that rely on very low-paid labor or casual workers, as the reservation wage (the lowest wage someone is willing to work for) will rise. Employers might need to offer higher wages or better conditions to attract workers off the higher benefit, which could accelerate wage growth at the bottom. That’s great for reducing inequality, but again something to monitor for inflation.Expanded Public Services (Childcare, Transport, etc.): Beyond housing, health, and education, the Greens plan includes various other public service expansions. For example, free or very cheap childcare is often mentioned (they propose 0 or nominal fee childcare). Accessible childcare can have a powerful economic effect by **boosting labor force participation**, especially among women. A famous case study is Quebec’s low-fee childcare program, which was found to more than pay for itself by enabling many mothers to work – the increased tax revenues outweighed the program cost[homelesshub.ca](https://homelesshub.ca/resource/impact-quebecs-universal-low-fee-childcare-program-female-labour-force-participation-domestic-income-and-government-budgets/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20net%20expense%20of%20%24,%E2%80%9C)[homelesshub.ca](https://homelesshub.ca/resource/impact-quebecs-universal-low-fee-childcare-program-female-labour-force-participation-domestic-income-and-government-budgets/#:~:text=leads%20to%20an%20expansion%20of,%E2%80%9D). Specifically, Quebec’s n1.6b investment yielded a $2.4b increase in tax revenues due to higher maternal employment and economic growthhomelesshub.ca. Australia could see similar gains: currently, childcare costs are a barrier for second earners in many families. Free childcare would likely increase the labor participation rate of parents, enlarging the workforce and potentially growing GDP. The short-term cost to government is high (childcare is labor-intensive to fund), but a significant portion might be recouped via higher income tax receipts from working parents. Over the medium term, higher female workforce participation is one of the surest ways to increase a country’s economic capacity – many European countries with generous childcare subsidies have seen exactly this result.The Greens also tout 50c public transport fares and bringing essential services (like energy, possibly transport) back into public handsgreens.org.augreens.org.au. Cheap public transport is effectively a subsidy to commuters and can reduce cost of living and emissions, but requires government operating subsidies. These are not typically huge in the context of a national budget, but in combination with everything else, every bit adds up. Nationalizing certain services (like energy retail or the grid) could involve one-off acquisition costs but might allow cheaper prices by removing profit margins. Those details go beyond the scope here, but in principle, expanding free or subsidized public services shifts costs from private wallets to the government budget, which the Greens intend to fill via their tax reforms.Fiscal Sustainability: With free education, higher welfare, and broad service expansions, the size of government in the economy would grow substantially. Australia currently has a tax-to-GDP ratio around 27% (among the lower end of OECD). The Greens’ program would likely push that well into the 30%+ range, approaching European levels. For context, Scandinavian countries often collect 44–48% of GDP in taxes and correspondingly spend that on public services and transferswww2.deloitte.comwww2.deloitte.com. They show that high-tax, high-spending models can be sustainable if employment remains high and the tax base is broad. One challenge for the Greens is that they focus taxes on the very rich and big companies; while this targets those most able to pay (improving progressivity), there is a question of concentration risk – relying heavily on a small section of taxpayers (billionaires and a few hundred large firms) for hundreds of billions in revenue. If the economy slows or if avoidance is rampant, revenues might undershoot, causing deficits unless spending is reined in or taxes broadened to others. A sustainable welfare state typically eventually involves broad-based taxation (e.g. everyone paying something like a modest increase in income tax or GST) because the scale of revenue needed is so large. The Greens, at least initially, avoid raising broad taxes like the GST (which is regressive). In the medium term, if their agenda remains and is popular, a future Greens government might need to consider modest general tax increases to solidify funding – a politically sensitive move, but common in countries with expansive public services (for example, Denmark funds welfare with a 25% VAT and high middle-class income taxes, not just taxes on billionaires). For the scope of our scenario though, we assume they stick to their plan of soaking the top end and closing loopholes.International Precedents: Countries like Sweden, Denmark, Norway have comprehensive free education, healthcare, childcare, and generous welfare – much like the Greens envision – and they remain prosperous, innovative economies. A key lesson from those countries is the importance of high employment and social trust: virtually everyone works, pays taxes, and as a result, the welfare model is financially viablewww2.deloitte.comwww2.deloitte.com. Also, welfare in those countries often comes with active labor policies (what’s termed “flexicurity” in Denmark – easy to hire/fire but strong unemployment benefits and retraining). Canada is another example: while not as social democratic as Scandinavia, Canada has elements like a child benefit system, public pensions, and a mostly free tertiary education (college fees in Canada are low by US/Aus standards, heavily subsidized). Canada shows it’s possible to have a generous social safety net without scaring away business investment, as long as policies are stable and well-managed. The unintended consequences to watch out for include: potential reduction in hours worked if people feel more secure (some might choose to work part-time and enjoy generous public services – not necessarily a bad outcome socially, but it can affect GDP), and pressure on immigration – generous welfare states can attract more migration (again, could be positive given aging demographics, but needs policy planning).Summary (Public Services & Welfare): Greens’ expansions of free education, welfare, and services represent a shift toward a Scandinavian-style social model. Short-term, putting money in the pockets of students (via debt forgiveness) and the unemployed (via higher benefits) would boost consumer spending and reduce poverty sharply. We might see a small decline in labor supply or need for higher wages in low-paid jobs as a new, higher income floor is set – a double-edged sword that improves workers’ lot but could worry some businesses. Medium-term, if managed with complementary policies, the payoff is a more skilled, inclusive workforce: higher educational attainment without debt overhang, higher workforce participation (especially if childcare is free)homelesshub.ca, and better matching of people to jobs they want rather than jobs of last resort. The fiscal cost is huge – tens of billions annually – but not unprecedented globally. The model can be sustainable if the tax reforms deliver sufficient revenue and if high employment is maintainedwww2.deloitte.com. Achievability is high for things like free uni (Australia did it before) and childcare (many countries do this). The biggest roadblock may be the welfare increase: politically controversial and economically requiring careful calibration to avoid discouraging work. Nonetheless, evidence from abroad suggests with active labor market engagement, even generous benefits need not cause mass joblessness. The key is that everyone – including the wealthy – contribute more to fund these benefits, which leads us to the taxation and fiscal side of the equation.www.philadelphiafed.orgwww2.deloitte.com

4. Taxation & Fiscal Policy

Implementing the Greens’ agenda relies on aggressive tax reforms to raise revenue and reshape who pays for nation-building. The two headline measures are a Wealth Tax on billionaires and a Corporate “Super-Profits” Tax, alongside closing tax loopholes for multinational companies and fossil fuel firmsgreens.org.au. We analyze the feasibility and risks of these taxation policies, including revenue sustainability, avoidance, and effects on investment.Wealth Tax on Billionaires: The Greens have proposed an annual net wealth tax on the ultra-rich – initially floated as 6%, later revised to **10% on net wealth over $1 billion** (with a rule that only 10$n23b revenue over 4 years and 50b over 10 years**[greens.org.au](https://greens.org.au/news/greens-will-tax-150-billionaires-part-revenue-plan-fund-dental-medicare-gp-free-and-other-cost#:~:text=Under%20the%20plan%2C%20Australia%E2%80%99s%20150,50%20billion%20over%20the%20decade). Some party communications have implied higher potential yields (even up to n25b per yearwww.sharecafe.com.au, though that likely assumes little avoidance and growing billionaire wealth). In practice, if Australia’s ~150 billionaires collectively hold ~584b (as cited in 2024)[greens.org.au](https://greens.org.au/news/greens-will-tax-150-billionaires-part-revenue-plan-fund-dental-medicare-gp-free-and-other-cost#:~:text=Between%202018%20and%202024%2C%20during,wage%20of%20the%20average%20Australian), a 10% tax could raise up to ~n58b in the first year before any behavioral response. However, such a tax would almost certainly trigger strong avoidance and legal challenges. Many European countries historically had wealth taxes around 1% and have mostly abolished them due to capital flight and minimal revenuewww.cato.orgwww.cato.org. The OECD found wealth taxes generally only raised about 0.2% of GDP in revenue on average (for France, Sweden, etc.) and were hard to enforcewww.cato.org. The Greens’ version is far more concentrated (only billionaires) and at a much higher rate, which raises the question: would the billionaires actually stick around and pay it? The policy attempts to limit capital flight by capping how much can be offshored (10% per year) – effectively an exit tax if they try to leave. But billionaires have sophisticated means: they could relocate and face one year’s big tax hit (10%), then be gone; they might use trusts, move assets to relatives, or legally challenge the tax as unconstitutional. It’s worth noting Australia’s constitution (Section 51(ii)) allows federal taxation, but extremely punitive or targeted taxes can end up in court. Even if legal, enforcement is tricky – valuation of assets (especially private companies, property, art, etc.) is complexwww.cato.orgwww.cato.org. The Australian Tax Office would need a new division of wealth auditors, and disputes could be lengthy. So, economically, counting on 5–10b a year from the wealth tax may be optimistic**. Some economists have warned such a confiscatory tax could scare off investors broadly, dubbing it “bonkers” and likely to **“discourage investment and hinder growth,”** with potential **legal challenges and economic fallout**[sharecafe.com.au](https://www.sharecafe.com.au/2025/02/12/greens-propose-wealth-tax-on-billionaires/#:~:text=Critics%2C%20however%2C%20express%20concerns%20that,challenges%20and%20adverse%20economic%20impacts). The more likely outcome is that few countries have tried to tax wealth at this level, so it’s somewhat experimental – there is a risk that anticipated revenues don’t fully materialize if billionaires shield assets or the truly footloose ones emigrate (taking their businesses or capital with them).On the other hand, **if successfully implemented**, the wealth tax could significantly reduce extreme concentrations of wealth over time (essentially acting like a slow redistribution of billionaire fortunes to the public purse). The revenue, while a small fraction of GDP, is not trivial – n50b over a decade could fund, say, almost the entire cost of eliminating student debt or a large portion of the housing program. Short-term reaction to this tax would likely be a chorus of corporate and investor dismay; markets might worry about Australia as a place for high-net-worth individuals (though for most global investors, it’s irrelevant unless they personally become Australian tax residents and billionaires). There’s an argument that only a minority of billionaires (those with predominantly Australian assets they can’t move, like mining magnates tied to local resources) would end up bearing most of the brunt; globally mobile tech or finance billionaires could shift residency to Singapore or elsewhere. In the medium term, if the wealth tax remains, it could gradually reduce the billionaire class’s influence – potentially a positive for democracy, but also possibly reducing some private investment or philanthropy that they might have done. Countries like Norway still have a wealth tax (around 0.85% on wealth over ~$150k, and higher for very rich) and have seen some wealthy individuals depart recently, but Norway still has plenty of investment and one of the highest living standards. The difference is the rate: 0.85$n100m turnover)greens.org.au is essentially a windfall or super-profits tax across all industries. This is inspired by ideas like Australia’s former Resources Super Profits Tax (RSPT) proposed in 2010 and by measures in places like Norway, which taxes petroleum profits at 78% (a normal company tax plus a special 55% resource rent tax)greens.org.au. Norway’s case demonstrates that a high tax on super-profits in a specific sector can work – oil companies still invest in Norway because the resources are valuable and the post-tax profit is sufficient. The Greens want to generalize this: whenever a company makes profits beyond a “normal” return, the excess is taxed heavily. They project this, along with closing loopholes, can raise the bulk of the **514b decade revenue**[greens.org.au](https://greens.org.au/tax-big-corps-billionaires#:~:text=We%E2%80%99ll%20raise%20over%20%24514%20billion,by). Roughly, if n50b is from wealth tax, the remaining ~$464b might come from this super-profits tax and anti-avoidance measures. That’s ~$n46b per year, which is very large – for scale, total company tax collections in Australia in 2022 were around $100b. So they are expecting to increase corporate tax revenue by almost 50$n514b in taxes to fund about that amount in servicesgreens.org.au. Should revenue fall short, they might resort to borrowing. In the short run, public debt could actually rise due to timing mismatches or investment front-loading (e.g. building houses now for returns later). But with today’s low interest rates (ignoring temporary inflation spikes), investing in long-lived assets like housing is generally considered prudent – especially if those assets generate income (rent). If the housing developer borrows say $100b but has rental income, it can service that debt. Australia’s public debt, currently relatively low (~Government debt ~40% of GDP), could accommodate some expansion if it’s investing in productive capacity.As for GDP, there may be a crowding-out vs. crowding-in effect debate. High government spending financed by taxes on the rich could crowd out some private investment (if, for example, corporate profits after tax are lower, companies might invest less from retained earnings). But it could also crowd in or directly create activity by building infrastructure and housing that enables future growth (workers with homes, efficient transport, etc.). The net effect on GDP growth is uncertain – it depends on the productivity of government spending vs. what the private sector would have done with that money. Much of the Greens’ spending (education, health, housing) can be seen as supply-side investment in human capital and physical capital, which should bolster growth in the medium to long term. Meanwhile, their taxes on excess profits or idle wealth arguably take from areas that might not reduce productive activity much (taxing rents and monopoly profits, which have low social value). If that theory holds, GDP growth could remain healthy or even improve due to a more inclusive economy. There is a risk though: if business confidence declines sharply, private investment could slump, leading to slower growth or even capital outflows putting downward pressure on the Australian dollar. A weaker AUD might actually boost export sectors (like manufacturing, tourism, farming), partially offsetting any investment retreat.Capital Markets and Investors’ Response: Financial markets would closely watch a Greens government that embarks on this path. Ratings agencies might worry about the unconventional taxes and potential political instability it could create (though in our scenario Greens stay in power unopposed). If they fear the government will prioritize social spending over debt repayment, they might nudge Australia’s credit rating down. However, if new taxes keep deficits low, the rating could remain strong. Some foreign investors might be skittish about the equity market – e.g., shareholders in Australian banks or miners could see lower dividends due to higher taxes, making Australian stocks less attractive. On the flip side, robust economic growth from stimulated demand could mean companies still do well even after taxes, just with more of the pie going to wages (due to higher welfare floor) and government revenue.One under-appreciated effect: inequality reduction itself can benefit macro stability. With less income concentrated at the top and more spread through the middle and bottom, you often get more steady consumption growth and fewer debt bubbles. For instance, if public housing reduces the need for households to take on massive mortgages, the risk of financial crises from housing debt could lessen. The Greens’ policies might thus reduce systemic risks in some areas (e.g., a smaller housing bubble, fewer people one paycheck away from default, etc.), which financial markets could eventually view positively.Lessons from High-Tax, High-Service Economies: The Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland) are prime examples where government takes a large share of national income and redistributes it, yet these economies remain competitive and innovative (think IKEA, Maersk, Ericsson – big firms thriving under those regimes). They achieve this by maintaining a cooperative relationship between government, business, and labor: high taxes fund top-notch education, infrastructure, and healthcare, which business benefits from; in return, businesses and citizens tolerate the taxes because services are high quality. Sweden in the 1970s–80s did experiment with extremely high taxes (even a wealth tax, and marginal income taxes above 80%), which arguably did lead to some capital flight and a slowdown, prompting reforms in the 1990s. Sweden abolished its wealth tax in 2007 and cut corporate tax rates to encourage investmentwww.cato.org. This suggests that while a high-service economy is sustainable, there is a tipping point where certain taxes can do more harm than good. The Greens’ tax rates (10% wealth, 40% on super-profits) are beyond what Scandinavia uses today (Norway’s 0.85% wealth tax and generally ~22% corporate tax plus specific sector taxes). In Denmark, known for high taxes, much revenue comes from a 25% VAT and income taxes on middle class, not a narrow wealth tax. So the structure of taxation in the Greens’ plan is different – more radical on the rich, lighter on everyone else. If it worked, it would indeed markedly reduce inequality (more aggressively than Nordic models do in taxation at least), but it might face more evasion issues.Overall Fiscal Outlook: In the short term (first 5–10 years), Australia under the Greens might run relatively high budget deficits initially if spending is front-loaded (building programs, welfare increases) before the full ramp-up of tax revenue or if the economy slows from any adjustment pains. Inflation might also push up interest rates, increasing government debt service costs. But because much of the new spending is investment or productivity-enhancing, the debt-to-GDP could be kept in check by higher GDP. By the medium term (10–20 years), if policies are successful, the fiscal situation could stabilize with high tax revenues flowing from a prosperous, more equitable economy. In an optimistic scenario, public debt could even start to decrease as a share of GDP if growth is strong – similar to the post-WWII era when strong growth helped work off war debts even amid high social spending. If policies face issues (say, tax revenue is far below projections due to avoidance, but spending isn’t cut accordingly), then debt could rise unsustainably, forcing a future course correction (taxing more broadly, trimming some welfare). That would be a major test: can such a deeply redistributive system maintain political and economic support long-term? International comparisons say it’s possible but requires fine-tuning and willingness to adjust (Nordics frequently adjust benefit levels, tax rules, etc., to keep the system working).Summary (Tax & Fiscal): The Greens’ fiscal vision is to fund a social revolution by dramatically increasing taxes on society’s winners (billionaires and big corporations). In theory, the numbers can add up – PBO costings show these measures could raise hundreds of billionsgreens.org.au, enough to cover the planned programs. The economic question marks are around tax avoidance, capital flight, and corporate behavioral change. A 10% wealth tax is unprecedented in scale and would test the limits of tax enforcement, likely yielding less in reality than on paper due to legal avoidancewww.cato.orgwww.cato.org. The corporate super-profits tax, if crafted well, could capture excess returns without deterring normal investment – but if crafted poorly or if global companies are uncooperative, profits may shift abroad. Short-term, Australia might see an initial windfall of revenue (especially if implemented in a booming profit cycle), enabling big investments. But the long-term sustainability of this revenue is uncertain – it depends on the ultra-rich continuing to generate wealth in Australia and not pulling back or leaving. The Greens’ strategy is a sharp redistribution that will face fierce opposition from those affected, and indeed history shows such efforts can be politically perilous (e.g., the mining tax saga). Yet, examples like Norway’s handling of oil profitsgreens.org.au or the general success of high-tax economies illustrate that with the right design and public support, high taxes can coexist with strong growth and innovation. The key is ensuring the tax regime is seen as fair and the revenues are visibly translated into benefits for society – if so, the risk of capital flight diminishes. In conclusion, the taxation plans are ambitious and fraught with execution risk, but not impossible. They are likely achievable to a degree (some revenue will be raised), but perhaps not to the full utopian extent projected – meaning contingency plans (like broader taxes or moderated spending) might be needed down the track to keep finances sound.www.sharecafe.com.auwww.cato.org

5. Macroeconomic Effects & Corporate Response

A Green-governed Australian economy would be characterized by heavy redistribution and a large public sector footprint. This raises broad macroeconomic questions: What happens to job creation, inflation, and private investment when the government redistributes so much income? How would multinational corporations and markets react beyond just taxes? Here we synthesize some likely outcomes and compare to other economies as reference.Job Creation and Unemployment: Initially, one can expect a surge in public-sector jobs: tens of thousands of construction jobs for housing and infrastructure, healthcare jobs for the new clinics, educators for expanded TAFE/university, and public service roles in the new programs (e.g., staffing a National Renters’ Authority). This would likely drive unemployment down, possibly to very low levels, unless offset by some contraction in private employment. Private sector job losses could occur in sectors that are effectively being supplanted or squeezed – for example, if dental care becomes largely public, some high-end private dental offices might downsize; if public housing grows, private real estate and property management might see less business; if government enforces price caps (like on energy or banking fees), those industries might hire less. Another area is administration and finance: wiping student debt eliminates the need for parts of the student loan servicing industry; more public healthcare reduces the scope for private health insurance admin jobs. These losses, however, likely pale in comparison to the jobs gained in service delivery and construction. Moreover, increased disposable income for lower-income people should boost demand in retail and hospitality, supporting jobs there.A potential medium-term challenge is productivity: Public job creation can reduce unemployment quickly, but ensuring those jobs are productive (building useful infrastructure, providing quality services) is crucial for long-run growth. If the public sector becomes bloated with make-work jobs, that could drag productivity. But if they truly are building houses, treating patients, caring for children – these are productive in a broad sense (they improve human or physical capital). Another issue is labor force participation: with a stronger safety net, some individuals might opt out of work (early retirement if the Age Pension is higher, longer job search on high JobSeeker, etc.). This could slightly reduce the labor force. However, policies like free childcare and education strongly increase participation. Many women, for instance, might join or rejoin the workforce if childcare is free and flexible. So there’s a push-pull: generous welfare could pull some out, while supportive services push others in. Likely, given international evidence, the net effect could be higher participation (since childcare and education effects are large). Countries with robust welfare (Nordics) actually have higher workforce participation than countries with stingy welfare (like the US)www2.deloitte.comwww2.deloitte.com, largely because the services enable more people to work (especially women).Inflationary Pressures: With significant public spending injections and higher disposable incomes, inflation is a real concern. If the economy is at or near capacity, pumping government money (even if taxed from the rich – because the rich’s spending might not decrease one-for-one) can lead to demand outstripping supply. Housing is a double-edged example: the Greens’ plan fights housing inflation by adding supply (which is disinflationary for rents and home prices), but during the construction phase, a surge in demand for construction labor and materials could drive up construction costs. There is a risk of wage-price spirals if, for instance, welfare increases force employers to raise wages to attract workers, which then feed into higher prices, etc. To mitigate inflation, the Greens might rely on their tax measures to withdraw money from the top-end (which softens demand from those groups) and the fact that many policies are supply-side (houses, clinics add supply). Over the short-term 5-year horizon, we might see a burst of inflation in certain sectors: construction, healthcare (due to wage competition), and general consumption (from cash transfers). The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) would likely respond by tightening monetary policy (raising interest rates) if inflation rises above target. Interestingly, some Greens have been critical of interest rate hikes and even suggested government intervention in RBA decisionswww.theguardian.com, but assuming institutional independence, the RBA might lean against an overheated economy. Higher interest rates would increase the government’s borrowing costs and also affect private investment (costlier loans). This interplay means the Greens’ fiscal expansion could be partly dampened by monetary contraction. If coordinated smartly, public investment that increases productivity (like education, infrastructure) can expand the economy’s capacity, helping to tame inflation in the medium term. For example, better public transport and housing can reduce living costs for households (deflationary), and a healthier population can lower healthcare cost inflation.Another angle: rent freeze and price regulation would directly lower measured inflation (housing is a big CPI component). If they also “ban supermarket price gouging”greens.org.au or regulate energy prices, these are price controls that can short-circuit inflation in the short term. However, price controls without addressing supply can lead to shortages. The Greens’ approach often couples price caps with more supply (e.g., rent cap with more housing, perhaps encouraging local food production for groceries, renewable energy for cheaper power, etc.). If successful, those measures mean Australians might experience a cost-of-living relief (lower inflation in essentials) even while macroeconomic inflation could be pushed by demand in other areas.Business Investment Climate: One of the biggest questions: will businesses invest and create jobs in an Australia governed by the Greens? There could be a shift in the composition of investment. Sectors like renewable energy, public infrastructure, healthcare, and education could see a boom (some of it public, some private to support the public projects). On the other hand, sectors like fossil fuels would obviously shrink due to Greens’ climate stance (not in the question’s scope, but implicit). High-tech or finance firms might be concerned about high taxes and regulatory intervention. However, companies also value stability, skilled workers, good infrastructure, and strong consumer demand – all of which the Greens aim to improve. For example, a tech company might be willing to pay a bit more tax if it can easily hire from a large pool of tech graduates (free uni may increase STEM graduates) and if its employees are happy with quality healthcare and public transport (which can make salary demands more moderate than if people have to pay for everything privately).In high-tax economies like Germany or Sweden, manufacturing and tech sectors still flourish because the workforce is extremely skilled and infrastructure is excellent. The predictability of policy is key: initially, a Greens government might scare some investors because it’s a big change. Over 10–20 years, if the policies bed in and the economy remains profitable (just with a different distribution), many businesses would adapt. Corporate opposition, however, would be intense early on: we’d see likely threats of disinvestment, ad campaigns claiming job losses, etc. Some might follow through – e.g. a mining company focusing future expansion in another country, or a billionaire-owned enterprise moving HQ overseas. But others can’t avoid Australia’s market or resources. The short-term market reaction might be negative for certain stocks (banks, mining, property trusts could drop on the stock exchange due to anticipated tax hits or slower profit growth). Risk premia on Australian financial assets might rise until confidence is built that the new regime isn’t wrecking the economy.Multinational Corporations: MNCs might lobby international allies to pressure Australia (for instance, big pharma might oppose drug price measures, global tech might fight digital tax enforcement). However, if Australia coordinates with other countries on corporate tax (leveraging OECD agreements), multinationals will have fewer places to hide profits. One worry is “capital flight” in terms of portfolio investment – wealthy individuals could sell Australian stocks, or funds might reduce exposure to Australia if returns are expected to be lower. That could cause a depreciation of the Australian dollar. A cheaper AUD, while making imports pricier (some inflation there), would boost export competitiveness and potentially drive more domestic production (import substitution) – aligning somewhat with Greens’ goals of more local, sustainable industry. So, paradoxically, market wariness could result in a currency adjustment that aids parts of the economy (manufacturing, tourism, agriculture).Financial Markets: Over 20 years, if the Greens policies succeed, Australia’s economy might resemble a Northern European one in structure – high taxes, high spending, but stable growth and innovation. Financial markets might then treat it similarly: countries like Denmark and Sweden have very high taxation yet attract investment and have strong currencies and low bond yields, because investors trust their fiscal management and the overall stability (income inequality is low, reducing social unrest risk). If Australia demonstrates that its big spending is matched by sufficient revenue and economic growth, investor confidence can remain or even improve (due to a more cohesive society). If not, worst-case is a crisis of confidence where bond yields spike and the government faces a financing crunch – but that typically happens when a government can’t cover its spending with revenue. The Greens explicitly intend to cover it via taxes.High-Tax, High-Service Economy Lessons: Looking at Sweden: in the 1970s it pushed very high taxes, and by the early 90s it had a crisis (not solely due to taxes – a banking crisis played a role). They reformed by cutting some taxes and reducing generosity slightly, but still kept a big welfare state. Denmark in the 1980s had stagnation and high unemployment partly because benefits were too easy for long durations; they reformed with stricter activation policies and bounced back in the 90s with strong growth, maintaining their welfare model. The takeaway is that fine-tuning and mid-course corrections are often needed. A Greens government over 20 years would likely learn and adjust as outcomes unfold – maybe moderating a wealth tax if it fails, or adjusting welfare tapers if workforce participation dips. Our analysis assumes “implement unopposed” but not that they would be blind to results; presumably they want the model to succeed and would adapt.Innovation and Entrepreneurship: One concern is whether heavy taxation dampens entrepreneurship. If investors expect to give up much of their upside (via super-profits tax or wealth tax), they might be less inclined to take risks on new ventures in Australia. On the other hand, policies like free education, healthcare, and a strong safety net can encourage entrepreneurial risk-taking – people may start a business knowing they won’t lose healthcare or drown in student debt, and bankruptcy isn’t a personal catastrophe with a solid safety net. The Silicon Valley model thrives in a low-tax environment, but places like Israel or Sweden have vibrant startup scenes in more communitarian contexts. Australia under the Greens might cultivate social entrepreneurship and tech geared towards public good (renewables, medtech for public health, etc.), supported by direct public R&D investment (which Greens likely would boost as part of infrastructure). So innovation might shift to different sectors but not necessarily decline.Societal and Structural Shifts: Macroeconomically, a more equal distribution of income often leads to stronger and more resilient domestic demand. Lower inequality can reduce crime and improve human capital in the long run, which is a subtle but important economic benefit. If poverty is essentially eliminated (through high welfare and public services), we might see reduced costs in the justice system, and a more harmonious labor market (less strikes or unrest, since more basic needs are met). Over 20 years, one could expect Australia’s Gini coefficient (inequality measure) to drop significantly, perhaps approaching the levels of Scandinavia (which are among the lowest inequality in the world after taxes/transfers). This could manifest in a larger middle class, fewer extremely rich and extremely poor. For businesses, a larger middle class means more customers. Henry Ford famously supported paying workers well so they could afford his products; similarly, Greens’ redistribution could create more consumers for Australian businesses (albeit while skimming off some of the top-end luxuries demand – billionaires buy yachts and private jets, which aren’t made in Australia anyway typically).International Economic Relations: It’s worth noting how international institutions might react. Australia could become something of a test case for green-left economics in a developed country. If it works, it might attract positive attention; if it falters, organizations like the IMF might issue warnings. Trade partners could be affected if Australia’s changes alter import/export patterns (for example, if domestic production is encouraged and imports reduced, some trading partners lose market). But nothing suggests a breach of trade rules – mostly these are domestic policies.Corporate Compliance vs. Resistance: Likely, after an initial period of resistance, many companies would learn to operate under the new rules, much as they do in higher-tax countries. Labor relations might shift too – with the welfare floor higher, unions could bargain from a stronger position (workers won’t fear unemployment as much). We could see higher wage growth, which for a decade in Australia has been sluggish. Higher wages can spur firms to invest in automation and productivity improvements to maintain margins – this could be a positive long-term (as happened in some Nordic countries, where high wages pushed companies to move up the value chain). However, there’s a transition risk: if wages jump faster than productivity, some businesses could fail or shrink, especially those in low-margin, labor-intensive industries. For instance, some marginal small businesses that rely on very cheap labor might close, but their workers would have better alternatives or safety nets. The economy might shift away from “cheap service” models (like some exploitative gig work) towards more formal, possibly higher-skilled jobs.Short-Term vs Medium-Term Macroeconomic Outlook: In the short-term (first 5 years), we’d likely see: robust GDP growth fueled by government investment and consumer spending (the stimulus effect), low unemployment, and possibly moderate inflation requiring RBA management. Sectors in flux (housing market adjusting to new rules, private health industry adjusting to Medicare expansion, etc.) could cause some volatility. The Australian economy might experience a “demand boom” – a bit like the post-war late 1940s or the 1950s when government spending on housing and infrastructure also drove strong growth (with some inflation spurts that were managed via controls and RBA policy). Corporate confidence might be shaky at first; investment could dip until they see how the new normal looks. Government acting as a major investor could fill any gap in the interim. In the medium-term (10–20 years), if the policies are sustained, the economy would probably settle into a new structure: a large public sector (perhaps 10–15% more of GDP than currently), high employment, and the private sector focusing on areas where it can complement or work alongside public initiatives (like building green technology, specialized manufacturing, high-end services). Growth rates could moderate after the initial stimulus, but could be more inclusive and steady. The hope would be to avoid large boom-bust cycles, as housing speculation is tamed and social safety nets automatically stabilize downturns (automatic stabilizers would be strong – in a recession, people have high welfare so they keep spending, which props up demand).Comparative economies like Sweden saw high growth in the 50s–60s under a social democratic framework, slower growth in 70s–80s amidst global turbulence, and renewed decent growth after reforms in the 90s. So Australia might similarly have an adjustment period then a stable path. Over 20 years, certain Greens policies might be dialed back if they prove unsustainable (for instance, maybe the 10% wealth tax becomes a more modest annual wealth levy or is converted into a hefty inheritance tax – which is often more enforceable since it’s one-time at death).Conclusion & Feasibility Check: When we ask “which policies are realistically achievable and which face roadblocks” from an economic standpoint, a nuanced answer emerges: Investments in housing, healthcare, education, and services are largely achievable with sufficient political will and smart phasing – the money can be found, and historical examples support their efficacy (housing programs worked beforewww.fresheconomicthinking.com; education and healthcare investments pay off in productivitywww2.deloitte.comwww2.deloitte.com). These yield long-term dividends in human capital and social cohesion. Major roadblocks lie in the revenue and incentive realm: extracting the needed funds from the wealthy and corporations without causing evasive behavior or harming the investment climate is the toughest challenge. The wealth tax in particular may be economically the weakest link – it’s difficult to execute and might under-deliver on revenue or drive wealth offshorewww.cato.orgwww.cato.org. The super-profits tax has more precedent (windfall taxes exist and can work), but broadening it to all industries is untested at this scale in a developed open economy. Labor market effects of generous welfare need managing – policies to encourage work (like voluntary job training, support for transition) should accompany higher payments to prevent reduced participation.Corporations and markets would initially react negatively – possibly threatening investment strikes or using media to predict doom. However, the international comparisons provide optimism: high-tax countries often have high living standards and competitive businesses, and public opinion can remain supportive if outcomes are good (people value free services and might prefer them over tax cuts if convinced it’s for the common good). Over 20 years, an Australia under full Greens policies could transform into a more European-style economy: lower inequality, a stronger social safety net, and public provisioning of many essentials, with the private sector adapting to a new rule-set that emphasizes societal benefit alongside profit. The economy would likely still grow and innovate, but the composition of growth would tilt towards public goods and green industries rather than luxury goods and speculative industries. Inflation might be a bit higher on average due to a high-pressure, low-unemployment economy, but not uncontrollable if matched by productivity gains and prudent fiscal-monetary coordination.Finally, one must acknowledge political economy: even if economically possible, vested interests would fiercely resist many of these changes (property investors, mining companies, private health insurers, etc.). The scenario assumes no political opposition, which is a big assumption. Real-world implementation would involve negotiation and likely some watering down of the most extreme measures (e.g., maybe a wealth tax ends up at 2% not 10%). Those compromises could actually improve feasibility – capturing many of the benefits without some downsides. In conclusion, economically Australia could afford and even thrive under a greatly expanded public sector and welfare state, as long as productivity and workforce participation are maintained, and tax avoidance is kept in check. The nation’s abundant resources and developed economy give it the capacity. The greatest risks are in execution and global market reactions, not in fundamental insolvency. With careful policy design and learning from global models, the Greens’ vision contains policies that range from readily achievable (public housing, free education – straightforward with funding) to challenging but manageable (dental care, super-profit taxes – requiring capacity building and enforcement) to the most uncertain (wealth tax – high risk of evasion). The medium-term outcome could be an Australia that is more equal and secure, though navigating the transition would require deft management of the economy to avoid instability.*www.sharecafe.com.auwww2.deloitte.com