U.S. Actions Aligning with Russian Interests (2005–2025)

I will research how the U.S., particularly under the Trump administration, has engaged with Russia in terms of military operations, business interests, and political narratives over the past two decades. This will include:

  • Analysis of declassified military operations and strategic alignments
  • Business ties and economic policies that may have benefited Russia
  • Political figures and media spreading Russian propaganda or narratives
  • The broader shift in alliances and geopolitical implications I'll gather information from credible sources and get back to you with a detailed overview.

U.S. Actions Aligning with Russian Interests (2005–2025)

Over the past two decades, analysts have noted numerous instances where U.S. policies or actors appeared to advance or align with Russian interests. This trend became especially pronounced during the Trump administration (both his 2017–2021 term and his current tenure as 47th president). Below we examine key areas – military decisions, financial dealings, propaganda efforts, and alliance shifts – with factual evidence and context from credible sources.

Military Moves and Operations Benefiting Russia

  • Syrian Withdrawal (2019): In October 2019, President Trump abruptly withdrew U.S. troops from parts of northern Syria. The pullout created a power vacuum that Russia (ally of Syria’s Assad regime) moved quickly to fill. Russian forces rushed to occupy abandoned U.S. bases and key strategic positions, even raising Russian flags over former U.S. outpostswww.reuters.comwww.themoscowtimes.com. This enabled Moscow and the Assad regime to reclaim influence over large swaths of Syria that they had lost control of years earlierwww.americanprogress.orgwww.americanprogress.org. Former U.S. officials testified that this decision directly benefited Russia, strengthening its foothold in the Middle East and undermining U.S. credibility with allieswww.americanprogress.org. Indeed, a Brookings analysis noted: “Putin benefits when the United States withdraws from Northern Syria,” as it allowed Russian troops to take on the role of regional peacekeeper at America’s expensewww.brookings.edu.

  • Ukraine and Military Aid: During Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine (since 2014), U.S. support has been crucial to Kyiv. However, in 2019 President Trump froze nearly $400 million in congressionally approved military aid to Ukraine while pressuring Ukraine’s president for political favors. Diplomats warned that this hold directly served Russian interests by weakening Ukraine’s defense. In a text message during the saga, Ambassador Bill Taylor wrote, “The nightmare is they [Ukrainians] give the interview and don’t get the security assistance. The Russians love it. (And I quit.)”www.brookings.edu. Trump eventually released the aid under bipartisan pressure, but the incident – which led to his first impeachment – signaled to Moscow that U.S. support for Ukraine could waver. Fiona Hill, the White House’s former Russia expert, emphasized that just floating “fictional” narratives casting Ukraine (not Russia) as the malign actor in 2016 “clearly advance Russian interests” and distract from Russian aggressionwww.politico.comwww.politico.com.

  • Soft Response to Russian Aggression: Multiple administrations struggled with how strongly to counter Moscow. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and fueled war in eastern Ukraine, the Obama administration responded mainly with sanctions – a reaction many deemed too weakwww.brookings.edu. Lethal military aid to Ukraine was withheld by Obama (and initially by Trump), which arguably benefited Russia’s military position in Ukraine. President Obama’s own officials later acknowledged that limited U.S. retaliation may have emboldened Putinwww.brookings.edu. Under Trump, skepticism toward confronting Russia was even more pronounced. Notably, when U.S. intelligence in 2020 found that Russia offered bounties to Taliban militants to kill American troops, Trump did not press Putin on the issue at allwww.politico.comwww.politico.com. He downplayed the intelligence and even suggested that the U.S. had done similar things, a response lawmakers said “gave Russia a pass” and undercut any consequences for targeting American soldierswww.politico.comwww.politico.com.

  • NATO and Force Posture in Europe: President Trump frequently criticized NATO and U.S. deployments that deter Russia. In 2018, he privately told aides he “wanted the U.S. to leave NATO,” according to multiple reportswww.cnbc.com. While no withdrawal occurred (Congress later passed measures to block it), Trump’s ambivalence toward the alliance was celebrated in Moscow. In 2020, Trump ordered a one-third reduction of U.S. troops in Germany (a key NATO ally), citing grievances with Berlin. Russia’s Foreign Ministry “welcomed” the plan, saying any drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe would “bolster security” in the regionwww.militarytimes.comwww.militarytimes.com. U.S. military leaders tried to mitigate the impact by repositioning some troops to Eastern Europe, but NATO allies and members of Trump’s own party warned that the cut “weakened NATO” and played right into Putin’s handswww.businessinsider.com. (Indeed, Moscow cheekily suggested Washington should also remove its nuclear weapons from Europe while it was at itwww.militarytimes.com.) President Trump (left) and Russia’s President Putin share a warm handshake at the APEC Summit in Vietnam, November 2017. Trump’s often-friendly posture toward Putin – in contrast to his combative approach to NATO allies – fueled perceptions that U.S. policy was tilting in Moscow’s favor_www.politico.com__www.reuters.com._

Numerous financial interactions between Americans and Russian interests have raised flags about undue influence or policy bias. In some cases, U.S. political figures and businesses engaged in lucrative dealings that aligned with Kremlin interests:

  • Trump’s Business Ties: Donald Trump pursued business in Russia for years. His company actively negotiated a Trump Tower Moscow project even during the 2016 campaign – a fact he concealed at the timewww.brookings.edu. This represented a potential conflict: Trump stood to gain millions from a Moscow deal while campaigning on improved U.S.-Russia relations. Earlier, in 2008, Trump sold a Palm Beach estate to Russian oligarch Dmitry Rybolovlev for $95 million (double what Trump paid just a few years prior), a strangely high price that drew scrutinywww.tampabay.com. Such transactions fueled speculation that Russian money heavily supported Trump’s businesses. The Senate Intelligence Committee later found that Trump’s campaign chairman Paul Manafort had extensive financial links to Russia-backed figures – he received tens of millions of dollars from a pro-Kremlin Ukrainian oligarch and even shared internal campaign data with a Russian operative in 2016apnews.comwww.justsecurity.org. The bipartisan Senate report labeled Manafort’s Russian ties a “grave counterintelligence threat”apnews.com, underscoring how private financial entanglements translated into potential national security risks.

  • Corporate Deals and Sanctions Relief: In 2017, Trump appointed Rex Tillerson – ExxonMobil’s CEO and a recipient of Russia’s Order of Friendship award – as Secretary of State. Tillerson’s Exxon had struck a 500 billion oil exploration deal with Russia’s state-owned Rosneft in 2011, only to have it stalled by U.S. sanctions after Putin’s Ukraine invasion in 2014[theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/11/rex-tillerson-secretary-of-state-trump-russia-putin#:~:text=win%20www,were%20imposed%20on%20Russia)[icij.org](https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2016/12/tillerson-directed-offshore-company-used-russia-deals/#:~:text=ICIJ%20www,work%20improves%20their%20countries%27). As Secretary, Tillerson advocated for better ties, though he officially maintained sanctions. In 2018–2019, the Trump Treasury Department (led by Steven Mnuchin) **lifted sanctions on companies tied to oligarch Oleg Deripaska**, after Deripaska agreed to reduce his ownership. This move, easing pressure on Putin’s close ally, prompted controversy in Washington. Within months of the sanctions being lifted, Deripaska’s aluminum firm **Rusal announced a n200 million investment in a new aluminum plant in Kentucky** – the home state of Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnellwww.politico.comwww.politico.com. McConnell had supported the sanctions relief (overriding bipartisan objections), leading to accusations of a quid pro quo. POLITICO reported that two ex-McConnell staffers even lobbied for the Rusal-backed project, heightening suspicionswww.politico.comwww.politico.com. While McConnell denied any connection, Democrats urged investigation into whether Russia effectively bought influence through this dealwww.politico.com.

  • Russian Money in U.S. Politics (NRA Case): A Senate investigation found that the National Rifle Association (NRA) – a powerful U.S. political group – acted as a “foreign asset” for Russia in the run-up to 2016www.finance.senate.govwww.finance.senate.gov. Russian operatives cultivated NRA insiders with promises of business deals, lavish trips to Moscow, and other benefits. In exchange, NRA figures opened doors in American politics for the Russians. The Senate Finance Committee’s minority report revealed that an NRA delegation’s 2015 Moscow visit was officially sanctioned by NRA leadership, contrary to claims it was private. They met high-level Russians (some under U.S. sanctions) and sought personal profit even as they gave Russians access to U.S. political circleswww.finance.senate.govwww.finance.senate.gov. One prominent attendee was Alexander Torshin, a Russian banker later sanctioned for alleged ties to Russian security services. The FBI would eventually arrest Russian agent Maria Butina, who had embedded herself in the NRA and GOP circles, for conspiring to influence U.S. politics on Moscow’s behalf. These revelations underscore how Russian money and influence were channeled into American organizations to quietly advance Kremlin-favored agendas.

  • Other Notable Links: Russian oligarchs and state companies have routinely sought influence by leveraging business interests in the U.S. For example, Putin-allied oligarchs like Viktor Vekselberg and Yevgeny Prigozhin spent years moving capital through Western banks and investments. U.S. authorities have investigated large real estate purchases (e.g. luxury condos in New York and Florida) by Russian nationals as possible money-laundering or influence schemeswww.icij.orghome.treasury.gov. In one emblematic case, Vekselberg – under U.S. sanctions – was revealed to have paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to a company linked to Trump’s lawyer Michael Cohen in 2017, raising eyebrows about buying access to the new administration (the payments were purportedly for consulting). While not every Russian business deal is nefarious, experts note that billions in illicit or strategic Russian capital have flowed into the U.S. over the past 20 yearswww.icij.org. This money not only enriches certain Americans, but can translate into leverage for Moscow’s interests – blunting U.S. policies (like sanctions) that Russia opposes.

U.S. Politicians and Media Figures Echoing Russian Propaganda

A number of American political and media personalities have been accused of amplifying pro-Russian narratives, whether intentionally or unwittingly. U.S. intelligence agencies and independent experts have flagged this as a key method of Russian influence: getting Americans to spread Kremlin propaganda domestically. Notable examples include:

  • Fiona Hill’s Warning: Fiona Hill, former NSC Senior Director for Russia, publicly admonished some Republican lawmakers in 2019 for pushing the “fictional narrative” that Ukraine (not Russia) interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. Hill testified that this false claim was propagated by Russia’s security services to deflect blame, and scolded officials: “Please do not promote politically driven falsehoods that so clearly advance Russian interests.”www.politico.comwww.politico.comHer stark warning underscored that even debates within Congress were being infiltrated by Kremlin disinformation, to Russia’s benefit. (Despite extensive evidence that the Kremlin hacked and meddled in 2016, a handful of U.S. politicians continued to float the Ukraine conspiracy, prompting bipartisan criticism.)

  • “Putin’s Favorite Congressmen”: Several past members of Congress became notorious for parroting Moscow’s talking points. Former Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) earned the nickname “Putin’s favorite congressman” for his vehement defense of the Kremlin line. He argued against sanctions on Russia, justified Putin’s actions in Ukraine, and even arm-wrestled Putin in a friendly encounter years earlier. Rohrabacher was so openly pro-Russia that the FBI warned him he was an active target for Russian influence recruitment, according to news reportswww.theguardian.com. Similarly, Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI) drew scrutiny in 2020 for using information from a Ukrainian lawmaker later exposed as a Russian agent (Andriy Derkach) in an investigation of Joe Biden. Johnson’s inquiry amplified unverified allegations mirroring a known Russian disinformation campaignwww.justsecurity.orgspectrumnews1.com. (U.S. Treasury officials would later sanction Derkach as a “Russian agent” engaged in election interference.) Though Johnson insisted he wasn’t spreading disinfo, his actions were cited by experts as an example of Russia seeding narratives into U.S. political debate via sympathetic figureswww.justsecurity.org.

  • Tulsi Gabbard: Former Democratic House member Tulsi Gabbard has been accused of consistently siding with Russian positions. Gabbard opposed U.S. interventions in Syria and Ukraine and often echoed Kremlin justifications. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Gabbard blamed the U.S. and NATO for provoking Russia, saying the war “could have been avoided if the Biden Admin/NATO had simply acknowledged Russia’s legitimate security concerns”kyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. These remarks tracked closely with Putin’s own rhetoric. Russian state media took note – Kremlin-run news outlets frequently praised Gabbard and even jokingly called her “our girlfriend Tulsi” on airapnews.com. In 2019, Hillary Clinton openly suggested Gabbard was favored by Russia as a potential “asset.” While Gabbard denied being influenced by any foreign power, her commentary has been repeatedly cited in Moscow’s propaganda outlets, indicating how a U.S. politician’s views aligned so neatly with Russia’s narrative that they were actively promoted by the Kremlinapnews.com. (Notably, in 2023–24 Gabbard left the Democratic Party and continued to advocate non-interventionist, Russia-friendly positions in media appearances.)

  • Tucker Carlson: The most prominent U.S. media personality accused of spreading Russian propaganda is former Fox News host Tucker Carlson. During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Carlson’s monologues often questioned why Americans should support Ukraine and echoed Russian talking points (such as claiming Ukraine isn’t a real country or that NATO provoked Putin). This earned him extensive fanfare in Moscow. In fact, a leaked Kremlin memo in March 2022 instructed Russian state media to “use as much as possible” of Carlson’s commentary on the Ukraine war, noting that he “sharply criticizes the actions of the United States and NATO”www.businessinsider.comwww.businessinsider.com. The Russian directive, revealed by Mother Jones and confirmed by other outlets, showed clips of Carlson were considered a strategic asset for bolstering domestic support of Putin’s warwww.businessinsider.com. On Russian state TV, hosts gushed that Carlson was practically “telling the truth for us.” An ABC News correspondent described Carlson’s talking points as “almost word for word” parroting Putin’s own justificationswww.businessinsider.com. This unusual convergence led prominent figures (from senators to Pentagon officials) to slam Carlson for effectively becoming a megaphone for enemy propaganda. While Carlson contended he was simply questioning U.S. policy, the incident vividly demonstrated how Russian propagandists exploit sympathetic voices in U.S. media to further their aims.

  • Other Figures and Outlets: Beyond these cases, Russia has cultivated a network of voices on both the far-left and far-right of the American spectrum. State-funded outlets RT and Sputnik hired fringe U.S. commentators to host shows that often undermined U.S. policies and echoed Kremlin views. For example, former MSNBC host Ed Schultz took a job at RT America, and comedian Lee Camp hosted a political satire program on RT – both pushing anti-Western narratives congenial to Moscow. Russian diplomats also established links with NRA officials, evangelical leaders, and even local U.S. secessionist groups over the yearswww.finance.senate.govwww.finance.senate.gov. The common theme is that any American voices willing to question or attack U.S. foreign policy toward Russia have been eagerly amplified by Moscow. This dynamic grew more visible under Trump, when praise for Putin or excuses for Russian aggression from U.S. politicians no longer seemed as taboo – creating an opening that Russian information operations exploited to full effect.

Shifts in Geopolitical Alliances – U.S. Tilt Toward Russia?

One of the starkest ways U.S. conduct “worked in Russia’s interest” was by undermining traditional Western alliances and norms that Moscow opposes. Since 2005, and especially 2017 onward, the U.S. at times distanced itself from historic allies and international institutions – steps that Putin’s government welcomed as victories. Key developments include:

  • Undermining NATO Unity: NATO’s collective strength has long been a bulwark against Russian expansionism. Yet President Trump often cast the alliance as a burden. He publicly berated allies (like Germany, France, Canada) and in 2018 privately floated withdrawing the U.S. from NATOwww.cnbc.com. (This was reported by multiple outlets and later confirmed by former aides.) Such remarks thrilled the Kremlin. Even without an actual pullout, Trump’s reluctance to affirm NATO’s Article 5 (mutual defense) until pressured and his characterization of NATO as “obsolete” sent shockwaves through Europe – and relieved Russia, which seeks to erode Western defense commitments. Former NSA John Bolton and others have said Putin was likely “licking his chops” at Trump’s NATO skepticism. While Congress barred Trump from quitting NATO outright, allies noted a chilling effect: by 2020, the U.S. president was not seen as a reliable leader of NATO, a strategic gift to Moscowwww.lawfaremedia.orgwww.lawfaremedia.org. (President Biden in 2021 had to reassure NATO that “America is back” to repairing the strain.)

  • Strains with the EU and G7: Russian strategy relies on dividing the U.S. from Europe. During the Trump years, Washington’s relations with the European Union and G7 partners often soured. Trump cheered Brexit and disparaged the EU as an unfair trade competitor. At the G7 summit in 2018, he clashed with allies so badly that he refused to sign the joint communiqué and left earlywww.politico.com. Most strikingly, Trump advocated for Russia to be readmitted to the G7 (making it the G8 again) without preconditions, even though Russia had been expelled in 2014 after seizing Crimeawww.reuters.comwww.reuters.com. In 2019 he stated it was “appropriate” for Putin to rejoin the elite group of democracieswww.reuters.com. America’s closest allies – Britain, Germany, France, Canada – rebuffed Trump’s idea and reminded him that Russia was expelled for violating international law and that nothing had changed on that frontwww.reuters.comwww.reuters.com. By siding with Russia’s desire for international legitimacy (over allies’ objections), Trump signaled a reversal of the united front that the U.S. and Europe had maintained against Russian aggression. Ukrainian President Zelensky and EU officials called the proposal a dangerous “sign of weakness” toward Moscowwww.reuters.com. In Putin’s eyes, the mere fact that a U.S. president was willing to invite Russia back – despite no Russian concessions – was a huge propaganda win, suggesting cracks in Western resolve to isolate him.

  • Public Deference to Putin: On the world stage, Trump often spoke more glowingly of Vladimir Putin than of democratically elected U.S. allies. This culminated in the infamous Helsinki Summit of July 2018, where President Trump stood beside Putin and openly cast doubt on his own intelligence agencies’ conclusion that Russia meddled in 2016. “President Putin says it’s not Russia. I don’t see any reason why it would be,” Trump declared, effectively taking Putin’s word over the unanimous assessment of the CIA, NSA, and FBIwww.theguardian.com. That jaw-dropping moment led even Republican leaders like Speaker Paul Ryan to rebuke Trump, affirming that “Russia is not our ally”www.theguardian.com. For Putin, who had long claimed Russia didn’t interfere, Trump’s stance was validation and a public-relations coup. Russian state media gleefully replayed Trump’s comments, while U.S. allies were aghast. One former NATO commander said, “We have never seen a president align so publicly with an adversary against our own intelligence community. This is what the Russians have been working toward – to sow distrust and division – and here we saw it on live TV.” The incident reinforced the perception that Washington was moving closer to Moscow’s orbit, or at least that the U.S. president viewed Putin more favorably than he did traditional allies like Germany’s Angela Merkel (whom Trump frequently disparaged).

  • Abandoning International Agreements: The U.S. also withdrew from several global agreements in ways that some analysts argue benefited Russia. For instance, in 2019 Trump exited the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a Cold War-era arms pact. While the U.S. cited Russian violations (valid concerns), the withdrawal freed Russia from treaty constraints as well, potentially allowing it to deploy intermediate missiles while pinning blame on the U.S. Russia had secretly violated INF, but after the U.S. withdrawal, Putin quickly moved to openly develop the once-banned missiles. Similarly, the U.S. departure from the Paris Climate Accord and the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) isolated America from allies (who stayed in those accords alongside Russia and China). In each case, Moscow used U.S. retrenchment to its advantage – positioning itself as a more stable partner to others. For example, after the JCPOA pullout, Russia strengthened ties with Iran and portrayed itself (with the EU) as trying to salvage diplomacy that the U.S. “recklessly” abandoned. These shifts aligned with Putin’s goal of painting the U.S. as unreliable and Russia as a steady global player.

  • Attitude Toward Autocratic Allies: Traditionally, the U.S. has kept authoritarian powers like Russia at arm’s length while embracing fellow democracies. Under Trump, this dynamic blurred. He often praised authoritarian leaders (Putin, China’s Xi Jinping, North Korea’s Kim, Turkey’s Erdoğan) while antagonizing leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Australia, and others. This reversal in tone was not lost on the world. As one European diplomat lamented in 2019, “It’s almost as if Trump prefers the company of dictators… It’s very worrying for the alliance of democracies.” Putin, for his part, publicly complimented Trump’s “honest” and “direct” style and even defended Trump during U.S. domestic controversies. The bonding between the American and Russian presidents – without corresponding policy concessions by Russia – suggested to many that the U.S. was tilting away from its allies toward a longtime adversary. Even after leaving office, Trump continued to laud Putin (at one point in 2022 calling Putin “savvy” for his Ukraine strategy, just as Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine). Such comments were aired endlessly on Russian TV to undermine U.S. and NATO resolve. In contrast, President Biden’s approach since 2021 restored a more traditional pro-alliance stance, though the shadow of Trump’s friendly disposition toward Moscow has lingered in U.S. politics.

Conclusion

Over the last 20 years, Russia often found U.S. actions working to its advantage, sometimes by American design and sometimes by accident or internal division. Militarily, U.S. missteps (like the Syria retreat or hesitation in Ukraine) handed Moscow opportunities to expand its influencewww.reuters.comwww.americanprogress.org. Financially, Russian money quietly penetrated American business and political networks, raising serious conflicts of interestwww.politico.comwww.finance.senate.gov. In the information domain, Kremlin propaganda gained American mouthpieces – from fringe political figures up to mainstream media hosts – sowing discord and echoing pro-Russian views inside the U.S.www.politico.comwww.businessinsider.com. Geopolitically, the Trump era in particular saw an erosion of U.S. support for the very alliances that contain Russia, to the Kremlin’s delightwww.militarytimes.comwww.reuters.com.

It is important to note that not all U.S. policies favored Russia – indeed, many in Washington pushed back against these trends (e.g. Congress enforcing sanctions, career diplomats countering disinformation, military leaders shoring up NATO commitments). Nonetheless, the pattern of the past two decades shows that when American leadership faltered or veered from traditional strategy, Russia was quick to capitalize. As a bipartisan Senate report on Russian interference warned, the Kremlin will keep exploiting any U.S. “vulnerabilities and divisions” to advance its interestswww.politico.comwww.politico.com. Understanding how and when U.S. actions have (even inadvertently) aided Russia is crucial for crafting policies that protect American interests and support its allies going forward.

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